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ABSTRACT
Robust Resource Allocation to Secure Physical Layer using UAV-assisted Mobile Relay
Communications in 5G Technology
by
Shakil Ahmed, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2019
Major Professor: Rose Qingyang Hu, Ph.D.
Department: Electrical and Computer Engineering
Due to the diverse applications of the internet of things (IoT), the unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) can be a viable solution to provide reliable connectivity for the next generation
wireless networks. The UAVs have numerous advantages to serve next generation users,
such as higher mobility, adaptive flight altitude, quick, easy, and cost-effective deployment,
etc. Moreover, the UAVs have the line of sight (LOS) communication link, which improves
the quality of service (QoS) of the 5G cellular users. Thus, the UAVs can be a good standing
to support different potential applications, such as emergency smart health users, continuous border patrol, the social unrest monitoring, and military surveillance, etc. On the other
hand, the UAVs have the security risk due to its air to ground broadcast nature. Although
the UAVs have these salient features, insignificant research on the UAV physical layer security analysis has been conducted. This thesis investigates the UAV performance for the next
generation of wireless networks while improving the physical layer security. The proposed
model considers the UAV-assisted mobile relay (UAV-MR), which serves as a mobile relay.
The model also considers the base station (BS), which serves as the source. Moreover,
the active presence of multiple eavesdroppers and one ground user are also considered in
the proposed system. However, the actual locations of the eavesdroppers are unknown to
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the UAV-MR while the UAV-MR knows the exact locations of the ground user and the
BS. Moreover, the three-dimensional flying direction of the UAV-MR is also analyzed in
the thesis, which becomes an essential parameter to design the UAV-MR trajectory. Thus,
the UAV-MR performance analysis, the physical layer security, and the UAV-MR robust
resource allocation, etc., are investigated. The improved performance is achieved by developing the framework for maximizing the achievable secrecy rate under the UAV-MR flight
time constraint while the multiple eavesdroppers are present in the network. A mathematical structure, which solves the maximization problem sub-optimally, is also formulated to
support the proposed efficient algorithm. Significantly improved performance of the proposed algorithm is illustrated via the simulation results, where the results are compared
with the backbench method.
(75 pages)
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT
Robust Resource Allocation to Secure Physical Layer using UAV-assisted Mobile Relay
Communications in 5G Technology
Shakil Ahmed
The unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are also known as drones. Recently, UAVs have
attracted the next generation researchers due to their flexible, dynamic, and cost-effective
deployment, etc. Moreover, the UAVs have a wide range of application domains, such
as rescue operation in the remote area, military surveillance, emergency application, etc.
Given the UAVs are appropriately deployed, the UAVs provide continuous and reliable
connectivity, on-demand, and cost-effective features to the desired destination in the wireless
communication system. Thus, the UAVs can be a great choice to deploy as a mobile relay in
co-existence with the base stations (BSs) on the ground to serve the 5G wireless users. In this
thesis, the UAV-assisted mobile relay (UAV-MR) in the next generation wireless networks
has been studied, which also considers the UAV-MR physical layer security. The proposed
system also considers one ground user, one BS on the ground, and active presence of multiple
eavesdroppers, situated nearby the ground user. The locations of these nodes (i.e., the
ground user, the BS, and the evesdroppers) are considered fixed on the ground. Moreover,
the locations of the eavesdroppers are not precisely known to the UAV-MR. Thus, this thesis
aims to maximize the achievable secrecy rate, while the BS sends the secure information to
the ground user via the UAV-MR. However, the UAV-MR has some challenges to deploy in
wireless networks, such as 3D deployment, robust resource allocation, secure UAV-MR to
ground communication, the channel modeling, the UAV-MR flight duration, and the UAVMR robust trajectory design, etc. Thus, this project investigates the UAV-MR assisted
wireless networks, which addresses those technical challenges to guarantee efficient UAVMR communication. Moreover, the mathematical frameworks are formulated to support the
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proposed model. An efficient algorithm is proposed to maximize the UAV-MR achievable
secrecy rate. Finally, the simulation results show the improved performance for the UAVMR assisted next-generation networks.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1

Motivation
As billions of wireless devices are being connected each year in 5G wireless networks,

the massive number of users require reliable connectivity and low latency. Fortunately, the
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) can meet those demands with a low cost and flexibility.
As the ground base stations (BS) cannot always guarantee the quality of service (QoS) in
various geographical regions, for example, mountain areas, impoverished wireless coverage
region, etc., UAVs can reach those areas to provide reliable connectivity with better QoS
and flexibility. However, UAVs have considerable physical layer security concerns due to
the air to ground wireless broadcast nature but still lack significant research efforts in this
area. Improving the UAV-MR physical layer security might be a research hotspot so that
the UAV relay can fly in the sky without the physical layer security concern. Moreover,
the UAV can serve next-generation cellular users without the legitimate information being
intercepted by the unknown eavesdroppers. In the next several sections, different types of
UAVs and related literature are studied to address the limitations and research scope of the
UAV physical layer security.

1.2

UAV Classification
Fig. 1.1 describes the UAV classification based size, wing, and altitude.
UAV size and altitude: Different sizes of the UAV [1] are described as follows: The

maximum weight of a small size UAV is 0 − 20 lbs, which can normally fly less than 12000
ft above the ground level. Its size can vary from a giant insect to 50 cm long. It can be
used for spying or military surveillance due to its lightweight.
A medium size UAV has a weight 21 − 55 lbs, which can fly more than 3500 ft above
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Fig. 1.1: The UAV classification.
the sea level. A large size UAV can fly up to 18000 ft mean sea level with a weight less
than 1320 lbs. A giant UAV can fly more than 18000 ft mean sea level with weight more
than 1320 lbs. Ultimately a high altitude platform (HAP) UAV maintains a 65000 − 164000
ft altitude from the earth In recent days, HAP UAVs are commonly used in the wireless
communication servers [3]. On the other hand, the LAP UAV can be used near the ground,
for example, border surveillance, and social unrest monitoring, etc.
UAV wing: There are two types of UAVs based on the wing, namely the fixed wing
and the rotary wing [2]. As the name implies, the fixed-wing UAV has a stationary wing,
which uses UAV’s forward speed to keep it aloft during the flight time. On the other hand,
the rotary UAV has multiple rotating blades, which help the UAV to be aloft on the sky.
However, the operation principle of both the fixed and the rotary wings are pretty much
the same. The only difference is that the rotary wing UAV does not require the forward
movement to keep the UAV aloft. Instead, the rotary blade makes the forward movement,
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which keeps the UAV aloft during the flight time.

1.3

Literature Review
UAVs have a bunch of salient features, which are essential towards the successful fu-

ture wireless communication system, for example, unmanned and remote operation, costeffectiveness, flexible deployment, high mobility, and reliable connectivity, etc. UAVs can
make a significant contribution to the various applications of wireless communication domain [4,5], such as social unrest surveillance, rescuing operation to unreachable and remote
areas, military and border transportation, and search operation, etc. Moreover, UAVs can
also be a good fit to support the next generation wireless networks, such as sending the
smart health-related real-time information to the destination/users, especially where it is
difficult to reach in a short time in the event of the emergency scenario. Thus, UAV applications in the future wireless communication can meet the excessive demand of different
types of users.
Due to various potential opportunities of UAVs, many telecommunications companies,
such as Qualcomm, Ericsson, Verizon, AT&T, and China Mobile, have started the UAV
related research projects for the next generation wireless communications [6,7]. In practice,
UAVs can be applied in two paradigms, namely
1. Using UAV as an aerial base station: The UAV works as a mobile base station in the
air, which can be flexibly deployed. It is also dynamic and can serve an on-demand
basis to the ground users. Moreover, UAV can be used as the aerial base station to support the emergency wireless communication service if there is terrestrial BS hardware
malfunction, provides offloading in a highly crowded environment, or unreachable and
unprivileged areas, where the ground wireless network is not supported [8] - [12].
2. Using UAV as a relay: The UAV can also be used as a relay in the air. If users are far
away from the BS on the ground, the BS serves the remote users via using the UAV
relay.
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UAV has better line of sight (LOS) communication links, which can better provide reliable
air to the ground communications and also ensure the legitimate communication link over
a long distance, especially in the outdoor environment. Moreover, the UAV enabled applications can gather the required information/data in real time and send to the ground
user.
However, UAVs can be quite vulnerable to the communication link interception due
to the openness of the transmission medium and broadcast nature of the communication
links [13]. Though the UAV-assisted mobile relay (UAV-MR) has the LOS air to ground
communication nature, the LOS type communication between air to the ground can be
considered as prone to the eavesdroppers, which leads to the physical layer security challenge
for UAV-MR communication. The security research has been focused mainly in the upper
layer protocol stack design using the cartographic methods. The UAV-MR physical layer
security has become an emerging research hotspot nowadays.
Very insignificant amount of research has been performed on the UAV-MR robust
resource allocation to secure the physical layer. To secure the physical layer, the UAV-MR
trajectory optimization is critical due to the active presence of multiple eavesdroppers in the
geographical environment. Moreover, such as the UAV-MR flight duration, location of the
ground user, locations of eavesdroppers, and energy consumed by the UAV-MR, etc., during
the UAV-MR flight play a significant role to design the UAV-MR trajectory [14] - [17]. The
authors in [17] studied the UAV trajectory optimization to maximize the sum-rate uplink
communication. The UAVs are equipped with multiple antennas. However, the presence
of eavesdroppers is not considered in their proposed system. Authors in [18] considered
a photo sensing method to optimize the UAV trajectory. They proposed an algorithm to
optimize the UAV energy consumption while the UAV is flying over the area of interest. In
the end, the authors investigated an optimal waypoint and an optimal UAV velocity while
the UAV is flying over the waypoints. In [19], a swarm of UAVs is considered to optimize
the trajectory, the UAVs energy consumption, given that the proposed system is free from
the UAV-UAV collisions. In [20], a joint UAV-users scheduling and UAV trajectory is
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optimized, which aims to optimize the average rate.
Another widely accepted UAV physical layer security design parameter is the achievable
secrecy rate [21] - [35]. The UAV sends secure information to the destination reliably
while the eavesdroppers are unable to intercept the secure information. Comparing the
UAV-to-user and the UAV-to-eavesdropper communication links, if the communication links
of the UAV-MR to the eavesdroppers are weaker than the legitimate air to the ground
communication link, the achieved secrecy rate is non-zero secrecy rate. On the other hand,
if the legitimate air to the ground communication link is stronger than the communication
link of the eavesdroppers, the achieved secrecy rate is not non-zero secrecy rate.
In the UAV physical layer security research, each of the active communication nodes is
considered as static on their locations in the recent research. Due to this assumption, both
the average channel gain of the legitimate UAV to the user communication link and the
UAV to the eavesdropper communication link mostly depend on the LOS communication
link based path loss and source or ground shadowing. In this scenario, the channel gain
can be achieved if the locations of the source, destination, and eavesdropper are known to
the UAV. If the channel gain of the eavesdropper is more significant than channel gain of
the legitimate source, various techniques can be investigated so that the positive achievable
secrecy rate can be achieved. The example of those techniques can be fading, resource
allocation, and power control, etc. However, if there is long enough distance between the
source and the legitimate destination, possibly the channel gain of the legitimate link is
smaller compared to the channel gain of the UAV to the eavesdroppers.
The authors in [24] considered the fading channel while their proposed system model
aims to maximize the achievable secrecy rate. They also considered the power control for
maximizing the secrecy rate. In [25], the authors proposed the power control over the
frequency sub-carriers to maximize the achievable the secrecy rate. They considered the
orthogonal frequency-division multiple access (OFDMA). The authors in [26] investigated
the physical layer security via designing the beamforming with channel coding. Their investigation is based on multiple input multiple output (MIMO) communication system.
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Moreover, the artificial noise is produced to deceive the eavesdroppers on the ground with
the help of multiple UAV relays. Thus, their proposed system model improves the overall
achievable secrecy rate performance.
The authors in [27] compared the performance of the static and mobile destination.
It is proved that the mobile destination has better performance based on the point-point
system. In [28, 29], the authors considered the joint power control on the legitimate sourcedestination and the artificial noise based on simultaneous wireless information and power
transfer (SWIPT) system. They maximized the secrecy rate based on joint power control
and SWIPT technique. The source sends the artificial noise and uses the beamforming
technique to the locations of the eavesdroppers. These procedures are done via jointly the
beamforming technique and the artificial noise employment in the MIMO system. Thus, the
legitimate link between the source and the destination is enhanced while the communication
link of the UAV to the eavesdroppers degraded. Eventually, the secrecy rate performance
is enhanced.
The authors in [30] proposed an efficient approach to maximize the achievable secrecy
rate via a transmission scheduling in a multiuser cognitive radio system network. The
authors investigated the point to point and source to the legitimate destination link to
maximize the achievable secrecy rate in [31]. Moreover, the co-operative jamming using the
relay for single antenna node is considered to maximize the secrecy rate.
Very initial theoretical research about the UAV physical layer security while maximizing the achievable secrecy rate is studied in [32]. M. Cui et. al. investigated the joint
optimization of the UAV trajectory; the UAV transmit power to optimize the achievable
secrecy rate [33]. The system considers the active presence of the eavesdroppers. In their
investigation, the UAV is considered as the mobile relay, and BS is regarded as the source.
On the contrary, Q. Wang et. al. also analyzed the secure physical layer communication
considering four nodes such as the UAV relay, the BS, the ground user, and the eavesdropper [34]. In their proposed system, the location of the eavesdropper is perfectly known to
the UAV, which is unrealistic in the real implementation. Moreover, the authors did not
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consider robust USV resource allocation.
None of the above literature addressed the physical layer security issue. This thesis
addresses those unresolved issues, which are not reflected in the above literature.

1.4

Summary the Chapter
This chapter discusses the prospect and challenges of UAV in next-generation wireless

networks. The classification of the UAVs is described. The motivation of the proposed
system model in the project is elaborated. The chapter further presents recent research in
the area of the UAV physical layer security. In the end, several limitations on the UAV
physical layer security are pointed, which are addressed in the later chapters of the thesis.

8

CHAPTER 2
UAV-MR PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY
In this chapter, the proposed physical layer security for UAV-MR communication is presented in details. Moreover, the chapter provides the proposed system model overview, for
example, the explanation of different parameters and assumptions, etc. The UAV-assisted
mobile relay (UAV-MR) has a big challenge of transmitting secure information to the ground
user due to the broadcast nature of the air-to-ground line of sight (LOS) channels. This
challenge is tackled via jointly designing robust UAV-MR trajectory, and transmit power
of the UAV-MR and the BS optimization in next-generation wireless networks. The thesis
aims to maximize the achievable secrecy rate considering the presence of one base station
(BS), one UAV-MR, one user on the ground, and multiple eavesdroppers on the ground.
The locations of the eavesdroppers are unknown to the UAV-MR when it transmits secure
information to the ground user. Moreover, the proposed model also considers the information casualty constraint, which guarantees the UAV-MR forwards the decoded secure
information from the BS to the ground user.

2.1

Background and Contributions
Recently, UAV is a new communication entity that has attracted considerable interest

to the 5G researchers [36] - [42] due to the enormous potential applications. Moreover,
UAVs have salient features, such as higher connectivity, LOS channel advantage, a better
quality of service (QoS), and spectral efficiency, etc., which make UAVs a desirable choice
to support the next generation wireless networks in various situations. While UAV can be
used a relay, there area two possible scenarios.
1. UAV-assisted mobile relay (UAV-MR)
2. UAV-assisted static relay (UAV-SR)
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In general the UAV-MR has more advantages over the UAV-SR [43, 44] in terms of
cost-effectiveness, fast deployment, and coverage, etc. The UAV-MR is moving all the time
while the UAV-SR has a fixed location [45]. UAV-MR can be deployed in various environments, for example, a remote area or areas with nature disasters. UAV-MR communication
has the physical layer security concern due to its air to ground broadcast nature. In this
investigation, the legitimate and secure UAV-MR communications in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers on the ground are studied. We make a realistic assumption that the
locations of the eavesdroppers are considered unknown to the UAV-MR. The goal of the
thesis is to maximize the achievable secrecy rate, subject to the robust resource allocation,
the mobility constraint, and the information-causality constraints, etc., under given UAVMR flight time. The formulated achievable secrecy rate maximization problem is not a
convex problem and difficult to solve. As such the key contributions of this investigation
are summarized as follows:
• Securing the physical layer based on joint optimization of the robust UAV-MR trajectory, and transmit power of the UAV-MR and the BS is studied for the next generation
wireless networks. The locations of the BS and the ground user are known to the UAVMR in advance. However, the actual locations of the eavesdroppers are unknown to
the UAV-MR. The UAV-MR knows the approximate locations of the eavesdroppers by
combining the information of the known regions of the locations of the eavesdroppers
and possible errors of the eavesdroppers for their actual positions.
• There are no direct communication links between the BS and the ground user, between
the BS and the eavesdroppers, and between the ground user and the eavesdroppers
in the proposed system model to blockages and shadowing. Moreover, the proposed
model optimizes jointly the robust UAV-MR trajectory (in x and y direction) and the
transmit powers of the UAV-MR and the BS. The study considers the average and the
peak transmit power of the UAV-MR and the BS to optimize the achievable secrecy
rate. The proposed model is more realistic by assuming the unknown presence of the
eavesdroppers.
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• The information-causality constraint is considered in the system, which allows the
UAV-MR to send only the decoded information from the BS to the ground user [46].
• Jointly designing robust UAV-MR trajectory, and transmit power of the UAV-MR,
and the BS can tackle the unknown locations of the eavesdroppers effectively.
• The formulated secrecy rate maximization problem is a non-convex problem. The
achievable secrecy rate non-convex optimization problem is solved sub-optimally in the
proposed system. The UAV-MR and the BS transmit power is optimized for the given
UAV-MR trajectory location. On the other hand, the UAV-MR trajectory location
is optimized for the optimal UAV-MR, and the BS transmit power. For the UAVMR trajectory optimization, S-P rocedure, the difference of concave (DC), successive
convex approximation (SCA), and interior point method (IPM) are applied altogether
to deal with the non-convexity of the UAV-MR trajectory optimization. Based on
the S-P rocedure, IPM, SCA, and DC, an efficient overall algorithm is proposed to
maximize the achievable secrecy rate, which solves the optimization iteratively and
alternatively.
• Finally, the simulation is performed, which shows the improved achievable secrecy
rate performance and the efficient UAV-MR trajectory.
The rest of the thesis studies the proposed system model and the problem formulation,
the sub-optimal solution, and the proposed algorithm.

2.2

Proposed System Model Overview
As shown in Fig. 2.1, a UAV based communications system covering geographical area

is considered. The environment consists of a UAV-MR, a BS on the ground, one user on the
ground, and multiple eavesdroppers on the ground while this investigation aims to maximize the UAV-MR achievable secrecy rate. In the proposed system, the UAV-MR can move
horizontally and dynamically during UAV-MR flight time. Unlike the UAV-SR with fixed
relay location, it is considered the UAV-MR has sufficiently higher mobility. Moreover, the

11

Legitimate link
Eavesdropping link
Eavesdropper

z
UAV-MR

y
Eavesdropper 1
Eavesdropper 2

BS

ground user
(0, 0, 0)

Eavesdropper M

Fig. 2.1: Communications from the BS to the UAV-MR and from the UAV-MR to the
ground user while M potential eavesdroppers intercept on the ground.
ground user has a fixed location. The ground user locates far from the BS, making the BS
not able to reach the ground user directly. Thus, the proposed system considers that the
BS serves the ground user using the UAV-MR in order to attain the required QoS. The
active presence of multiple eavesdroppers is also considered in the proposed UAV-MR to
ground user communication system. The UAV-MR does not know the exact locations of
the eavesdroppers while approximated regions of the locations of the eavesdroppers can be
estimated by the UAV-MR. These eavesdroppers try to intercept the legitimate communication links between the UAV-MR and the ground user. The locations of the eavesdroppers
are considered far from the BS and near to the ground user, as shown in Fig. 2.1.

x
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Each of the nodes, i.e., the UAV-MR, the BS, the ground user, and the eavesdroppers,
is equipped with a single antenna. The proposed system does not consider any direct
link between the BS to the ground user, between the ground user to the eavesdroppers,
and between the BS to the eavesdroppers due to long distance, or severe blockage and
shadowing, which may happen in the mega-cities due to the tall buildings and other obstacles
or remote areas, for example, the high mountains. The BS and the UAV-MR establish the
legitimate communication link to the UAV-MR and the ground user during the UAV-MR
flight time. During the UAV-MR flight time, the UAV-MR flies over the ground user at a
fixed altitude. Moreover, the proposed wireless system is developed in three-dimensional
coordinate systems.
The UAV-MR flies at a finite time horizon 0 ≤ t ≤ T , where T is in second, due to
its limited power resource, for the reasons such as coming back to the original location for
charging. This finite time horizon plays a significant role to design the UAV-MR trajectory
location. The UAV-MR flies at a fixed altitude hf while it changes its (x, y) locations
serving as a mobile relay during the 0 ≤ t ≤ T flight time. Moreover, hf has a minimum
altitude so as to avoid the tall buildings and other obstacles during the UAV-MR flight
duration. Thus, the UAV-MR does not require ascending or descending while the UAV-MR
is flying over the ground user.
In this thesis, two of the UAV-MR operation phases, i.e., the takeoff phase and the
landing phase, are ignored. Thus, this investigation only focuses on the UAV-MR flight
operation period during 0 ≤ t ≤ T flight time. The channel gains for all the possible
communication links, such as the BS to the UAV-MR, the UAV-MR to the ground user,
and the UAV-MR to the eavesdroppers are calculated based on finite time horizon 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
Moreover, the presence of a set of active eavesdroppers in the system is denoted as M,
where M={1, 2, 3, ..., M } and M represents the total number of eavesdroppers. The UAVMR establishes the legitimate link to the ground user and transmits secure information to
the ground user. M set of eavesdroppers attempt to intercept the legitimate communication
link from the UAV-MR to the ground user. The UAV-MR knows the perfect locations of
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the BS and the ground user while only estimated locations with errors of the eavesdroppers
are known to the UAV-MR.

Table 2.1: List of mathematical symbols used in Chapter 2
Symbol
Description
M
Set of the eavesdroppers
M

Total number of eavesdroppers

T

The UAV-MR flight time period

hf

The fixed altitude of the UAV-MR

(xu , yu , hf )
(xb , yb , 0)

3D location of the BS

(xm , ym , 0)

Actual 3D location of the eavesdropper, m

a , 0)
(xam , ym

Estimated 3D location of the eavesdropper, m

(4xm , 4ym , 0)
lm

2.3

3D location of the UAV-MR

Set of possible errors of the eavesdropper, m
Radius of the circular region of the eavesdropper, m

3D Locations of the UAV-MR, the ground user, and the BS
Without the loss of generality, the proposed system is developed in the 3D coordinate

system. The time varying UAV-MR location during 0 ≤ t ≤ T is defined as (xu (t), yu (t), hf ),
where xu (t) denotes the time varying x-coordinate and yu (t) defines the time varying ycoordinate. The fixed location of the BS on the ground is (xb , yb , 0), where xb and yb define
the BS in x and y coordinates, respectively. The UAV-MR knows the exact location of
the BS. Without the loss of generality, the ground user location is considered as (0, 0, 0),
which is correctly known by the UAV-MR. The BS allows the UAV-MR to store the secure
information so that the UAV-MR can send the decoded secure information to the ground
user. The list of the mathematical symbols used in this chapter is described in Table 2.1.
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2.4

Location of Eavesdroppers
It is almost impossible for the UAV-MR to find out the exact locations of the eaves-

droppers as most of the eavesdroppers tend to hide themselves well. For eavesdropper m on
the ground, its exact location is defined as (xm , ym , 0), which is unknown to the UAV-MR.
Nevertheless, it is assumed that the UAV-MR knows the regions where the eavesdroppers
are located. In order to estimate the locations of the eavesdroppers, a circular region of
eavesdropper m, m ∈ M, is assumed, as shown in Fig. 2.1. The UAV-MR can estimate the
region of eavesdroppers locations and calculate the possible errors from the actual locations
of the eavesdroppers.
The actual location of the eavesdropper m is calculated as follows.

xam = xm + 4xm ,

(2.1)

a
ym
= ym + 4ym ,

(2.2)

za = 0,

(2.3)

a , 0) defines the actual location of the eavesdropper m. (x , y , 0) is the
where (xam , ym
m m

estimated location of the eavesdropper m.
lm is the radius of the circular region, where the eavesdropper m is located. (4xm , 4ym , 0) ∈
εm , where (4xm , 4ym , 0) defines the possible error in the location of the eavesdropper m.
Moreover, εm describes the set of possible errors of the eavesdropper m, which is the approximated possible errors from the actual location of the eavesdropper m. The estimated
location of the eavesdropper m is the center of the circular region, which is (xm , ym , 0). If
the eavesdropper m lies on the uncertain circular region [33], the following condition must
be satisfied.
p
2 ≤l ,
4x2m + 4ym
m

(2.4)

where lm is the radius of the uncertain circle with the center (xm , ym , 0). In practice, the
UAV-MR has a higher chance of LOS air-to-ground communication links due to the higher
altitude of the UAV-MR during flight. Thus, the air-to-ground communication link is used
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lm
( xm , ym , 0)

Fig. 2.2: Circular region of the eavesdropper, m, where lm is the radius and (xm , ym , 0) is
the center of the circular region.
to send secure information from the UAV-MR to the ground user.

2.5

Summary of the Chapter
This Chapter 2 describes the proposed system model. Moreover, the chapter summa-

rizes the contribution of the thesis. Different scenarios are also addressed using several
figures to define the system model accurately and clearly. The locations of all the nodes,
i.e., the BS, the UAV-MR, the eavesdroppers, and the ground user, are also explained in
detail. The locations of the eavesdroppers, calculated by the UAV-MR, are also addressed
in the chapter. The Chapter 3 will discuss the BS to UAV-MR, the UAV-MR to ground
user, and the UAV-MR to eavesdroppers channel gains and data rate, which eventually
formulate the achievable secrecy rate problem discussed in Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 3
THE ACHIEVABLE SECRECY RATE
This chapter discusses the achievable secrecy rate, including the BS to the UAV-MR,
the UAV-MR to the ground user, and the UAV-MR to the eavesdropper data rate. The
achievable secrecy rate is then formulated, considering the unknown active presence of
multiple eavesdroppers while the UAV-MR transmits secure information from the BS to
ground user using the UAV-MR.
The location of the UAV-MR changes with time while the UAV-MR is flying. Thus, the
distance between the UAV-MR and the ground user also changes with time. The channel
condition is also changed accordingly. A dynamic channel model, reflecting those changes
with the UAV-MR trajectory location, is formulated based on the LOS communication
links. Before designing the UAV-MR trajectory location, the flight duration of UAV-MR is
defined as 0 ≤ t ≤ T , where T is a time in second. Moreover, hf defines the UAV-MR fixed
altitude, which can correspond to the minimum UAV-MR altitude required for buildings
or mountains avoidance without frequent ascending and descending. However, the time
varying location for UAV-MR over 0 ≤ t ≤ T is (xu (t), yu (t), hf ). The list of mathematical
symbols used in this chapter is listed in Table 3.1.

3.1

The BS to the UAV-MR Data Rate
The BS to the UAV-MR channel gain is based on LOS communication links. This

investigation does not consider the Doppler effect [47] due to the mobility of the UAV-MR
over 0 ≤ t ≤ T flight time. The channel gain from the BS to the UAV-MR over 0 ≤ t ≤ T
flight time based on free space path loss can be calculated as

cbu (t) =

(xu (t) − xb

)2

β0
,
+ (yu [(t)−yb )2 + h2f

(3.1)
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Symbol
rs

Table 3.1: List of mathematical symbols in Chapter 3
Description
The UAV-MR achievable secrecy rate

cbu

The BS to the UAV-MR channel gain

cug

The UAV-MR to the ground user channel gain

cue

The UAV-MR to the eavesdropper, m channel gain

rbu

The BS to the UAV-MR achievable data rate

rug

The UAV-MR to the ground user achievable data rate

rue

The UAV-MR to the eavesdropper, m achievable data rate

pu

The UAV-MR transmit power

pb

The BS transmit power

β0

The channel power at reference distance d0 = 1 m

pau

The UAV-MR average power

pm
u

The UAV-MR peak power

pab

The BS average power

pm
b

The BS peak power

where β0 is the channel power gain [48] having reference distance d0 = 1 m, (xu (t), yu (t), hf )
is the location of the UAV-MR on the air, and (xb , yb , 0) is the location of the BS on the
ground. The BS transmit power also needs to be considered for calculating the BS to the
UAV-MR data rate.
Thus, this project considers the BS average and peak transmit power constraints as
follows.
1
T −1

Z

T −1

pb (t)dt ≤ pab , ∀t,

(3.2)

t=1

0 ≤ pb (t) ≤ pm
b , ∀t,

(3.3)

pab ≤ pm
b ,

(3.4)

where pb (t) ∈ IR+ is the BS transmitted power. pab and pm
b are the average and peak power
of BS, respectively.
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Thus, the achievable data rate from the BS to the UAV-MR can be written as


pb (t)cbu (t)
,
rbu (t) = log2 1 +
σ2


pb (t)γ
= log2 1 +
,
(xu (t) − xb )2 + (yu (t)−yb )2 + h2f

(3.5)

where
γ=

β0
.
σ2

(3.6)

σ 2 is the power of the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at the receiver. Eqn. 3.5
describes the achievable data rate for the BS to UAV-MR.

3.2

The UAV-MR to the Ground User Data Rate
Like the BS to UAV-MR communication links, the channel gain between the UAV-MR

and the ground user is also based on LOS communication links. The channel gain between
the UAV-MR and the ground user over 0 ≤ t ≤ T flight time based on LOS communication
links can be calculated as follows.

cug (t) =

(xu (t) −

0)2

β0
,
+ (yu (t) − 0)2 + h2f

(3.7)

where (0, 0, 0) is the exact location of the ground user. Similar to sub-section 3.1, the UAVMR transmit power is also considered. The UAV-MR average and peak transmit power
constraints as follows.
1
T −1

Z

T

pu (t)dt ≤ pau , ∀t,

(3.8)

t=2

0 ≤ pu (t) ≤ pm
u , ∀t,

(3.9)

pau ≤ pm
u,

(3.10)

where pu (t) ∈ IR+ is the UAV-MR transmitted power. pau and pm
u are the average and peak
powers of the UAV-MR, respectively.
The UAV-MR to the ground user data rate can be calculated as follows.
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pu (t)cug (t)
,
rug (t) = log2 1 +
σ2


pu (t)γ
.
= log2 1 + 2
xu (t) + yu2 (t) + h2f


(3.11)

Eqn. 3.11 describes the achievable data rate for the UAV-MR to ground user.

3.3

The UAV-MR to the Eavesdropper Data Rate
In the proposed system, as there is no direct communication link between the BS

and the eavesdroppers, the eavesdroppers attempt to intercept the legitimate UAV-MR to
ground user communication links. Moreover, while intercepting the legitimate communication link, the UAV-MR to the eavesdropper communication link is also based on LOS.
The channel gain between the UAV-MR and the eavesdropper m, where m ∈ M , can be
expressed as follows.

cue (t) =

(xu (t) −

xam )2

β0
,
a )2 + h2
+ (yu (t) − ym
f

(3.12)

a , 0) is the eavesdropper m location. The achievable data rate from the UAVwhere (xam , ym

MR to the eavesdropper m can be written as


pu (t)cue (t)
rue (t) = log2 1 +
σ2


pu (t)γ
= log2 1 +
.
a )2 + h2
(xu (t) − xam )2 + (yu (t) − ym
f
3.4

(3.13)

Information Causality Constraint
The information causality constraint [49] is stated as follows. The secure information

of the BS, which is sent to the UAV-MR and the UAV-MR has no clue to know secure
information before sending to the UAV-MR, can be gained by the UAV-MR using its local
resource. On the other hand, if secure o bits are sent from the BS to the UAV-MR, the
complete secure information received by the UAV-MR must not higher be greater than the
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secure 0 bits.
The secure information of the BS is allowed to be stored in the UAV-MR, while the
UAV-MR forwards the secure information to the ground user in any of the remaining slots.
Now, the information-causality constraint [34, 35] is imposed and it can be expressed as

rug (1) = 0,
Z

t

Z

(3.14)

t−1

rug (j)dj ≤

rbu (j)dj.

(3.15)

j=1

j=2

Eqs. 3.14 - 3.15 make sure that the UAV-MR forwards only the secure information received
from the BS.

3.5

The Achievable Secrecy Rate
To achieve the maximum secrecy rate with the secure UAV-MR and the ground user

communication, joint robust UAV-MR trajectory, and transmit power of the UAV-MR and
the BS can maximize the achievable secrecy rate. The achievable secrecy rate in bps/Hz
can be expressed as
Z

T

rs (t) =


rug (t) − max

t=2

max


rue (t) dt,

m∈M (4xm ,4ym )∈εm

(3.16)

where rug (t) and rue (t) are expressed in eq. 3.11 and eq. 3.13, respectively. Eq. 3.16 cannot
guarantee the maximized achievable secrecy rate of the proposed system, unless the relevant
constraints are added and the maximization problem is formulated. In the next chapter,
the achievable secrecy rate optimization problem is formulated and solved sub-optimally.
We propose an efficient algorithm aiming to optimize the UAV-MR trajectory location, and
transmit power of the UAV-MR and the BS under a number of constraints.

3.6

Summary of the Chapter
The achievable secrecy rate problem is formulated in this chapter, considering the pres-

ence of the UAV-MR, the BS, the ground user, and multiple unknown eavesdroppers on the
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ground for the given UAV-MR flight time. While formulating the problem, UAV-MR trajectory, and the transmit powers of the UAV-MR and the BS design are jointly considered.
The BS and the UAV-MR average and peak transmit power constraints are also discussed.
Moreover, the information casualty constraint is also introduced so that the UAV-MR can
only forward the received secure information to the ground user. In the next Chapter 4,
the achievable secrecy rate optimization problem with the relevant constraints is formulated. Several tractable approaches are also proposed to solve the formulated optimization
problem sub-optimally.
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CHAPTER 4
ACHIEVABLE SECRECY RATE MAXIMIZATION
In this chapter, the achievable secrecy rate maximization problem is formulated. Due
to the non-convexity, the formulated achievable secrecy rate maximization cannot be solved
just in a single step because of various factors, such as continuous time, nature of eq. 3.16,
and the infinite number errors of the locations of the eavesdroppers, etc. A tractable
approach is proposed to solve the optimization problem, which is summarized as follows.
• Firstly, due to the UAV-MR continuous time flight duration, time t is discretized into
a number of equal time slots using the state space representation in Section 4.1.
• Secondly, the achievable secrecy rate maximization problem is formulated in Section 4.2.
• Thirdly, the achievable formulated problem is non-smooth due to its objective function
(i.e., eq. 4.13a). Thus, the non-smoothness of the objective function is tackled in
Section 4.3.
• The maximization problem is solved sub-optimally. The sub-optimal solution of the
UAV-MR transmit power, and the BS transmit power is achieved for a given UAV-MR
trajectory location in Section 4.4. Further the sub-optimal solution of the UAV-MR
trajectory location is achieved using the sub-optimal transmit power of the UAV-MR
and BS in Section 4.5.
• An efficient algorithm is proposed in Section 4.6, which can guarantee the improved
achievable secrecy rate performance.
Moreover, the list of mathematical symbols used in this Chapter 4 is described in
Table 4.1.

23
Table 4.1: List of mathematical symbols in Chapter 4
Symbol Description
N
Total number of discrete time slots

4.1

T

The UAV-MR flight time

ρt

The size of a time slot

vm

The UAV-MR flying speed

[, η

Non-negative parameters

λ

Lagrange variable

Γ

Variable

z, u, t

Slack variables

Discrete Linear State Space Representation
In the proposed system, the UAV-MR has the flight duration 0 ≤ t ≤ T , where T is

in second. The UAV-flight time horizon T is divided into N equal time slots, indexed by
n = 1, 2, 3, ......., N . The slot size is ρt , so we have

ρt =

T
.
N

(4.1)

Moreover, ρt is small, static, and equal size time slot. The value of ρt is chosen in such
a way that the location of the UAV-MR is considered static within each time slot. Thus,
the discrete-time UAV-MR location can be represented as (xu [n], yu [n], hf ). From eq. 3.5,
the achievable data rate between the BS and the UAV-MR can be reformulated as follows.

rbu [n] = log2 1 +


pb [n]γ
, n = 1, 2, ..., N − 1,
(xu [n] − xb )2 + (yu [n] − yb )2 + h2f

(4.2)

where n is time slot. Similarly, using eq. 3.11, the achievable data rate between the UAV-MR
and the ground user can be reformulated as follows.

rug [n] = log2


pu [n]γ
1+ 2
, n = 2, 3, ..., N.
xu [n] + yu2 [n] + h2f

(4.3)
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The achievable data rate between the UAV-MR and the eavesdropper m from eq. 3.13
can be reformulated as follows.

rue [n] = log2 1 +


pu [n]γ
, n = 2, 3, ..., N.
a ) 2 + h2
(xu [n] − xam )2 + (yu [n] − ym
f

(4.4)

The BS transmit power constraints from eqs. 3.2 - 3.3 can be reformulated as follows.
N −1
1 X
pb [n] ≤ pab , ∀n,
N −1

(4.5)

0 ≤ pb [n] ≤ pm
b , ∀n.

(4.6)

n=1

Similarly, using eqs. 3.8 - 3.9, the UAV-MR transmit power constraints can be reformulated as follows.
N

1 X
pu [n] ≤ pau , ∀n,
N −1

(4.7)

0 ≤ pu [n] ≤ pm
u , ∀n.

(4.8)

n=2

The information-causality constraint is also represented using eqs. 3.14 - 3.15 in terms
of state space representation as follows

rug [1] = 0,
n
X
j=2

rug [j] ≤

n−1
X

rbu [j], n = 2, 3, ..., N.

(4.9)

(4.10)

j=1

Let the initial and final locations of the UAV-MR are (xu [1], yu [1], hf ) and (xu [N ], yu [N ], hf ),
respectively. Thus, the UAV-MR mobility constraint can be written as

(xu [n] − xu [n − 1])2 + (yu [n] − yu [n − 1])2 ≤ (vm ρt )2 ,

(4.11)
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where vm defines the UAV-MR speed. Finally, the achievable secrecy rate in terms of
discrete time representation can be expressed as
N 
X
rs [n] =
rug [n] − max

4.2

max

m∈M (4xm ,4ym )∈εm

n=2


rue [n] .

(4.12)

The Achievable Secrecy Rate Maximization Problem Formulation
Now, using eq. 4.12 and relevant constraints, the achievable secrecy rate maximization

can be formulated as follows.

max
xu [n],yu [n],pu [n],pb [n]

s.t.

n
X
j=2

N 
X
rug [n] − max
n=2

max

m∈M (4xm ,4ym )∈εm

+
rue [n] ,

 n−1



X
pu [j]cug [j]
pb [j]cbu [j]
≤
, n = 2, 3, ...., N,
log2 1 +
log2 1 +
σ2
σ2

(4.13a)

(4.13b)

j=1

(xu [n] − xu [n − 1])2 + (yu [n] − yu [n − 1])2 ≤ (vm ρt )2 ,

(4.13c)

N −1
1 X
pb [n] ≤ pab ,
N −1

(4.13d)

0 ≤ pb [n] ≤ pm
b ,

(4.13e)

n=1

N

1 X
pu [n] ≤ pau ,
N −1

(4.13f)

0 ≤ pu [n] ≤ pm
u,

(4.13g)

n=2

where, in eq. 4.13a, [.]+ , max(., 0). Eq. 4.13b implies the information causality constraint.
Eq. 4.13c defines the mobility constraint of the UAV-MR during the UAV-MR flight time.
Moreover, eqs. 4.13d - 4.13e define the average and peak power constraints of the BS,
respectively. On the other hand, eqs. 4.13f - 4.13g describe the average and peak power
constraints of the UAV-MR, respectively. However, eq. 4.13 is too challenging to solve using
the conventional optimization technique due to the following reasons.
1. The non-convexity nature of eq. 4.13a and eq. 4.13b.
2. The non-smoothness of the objective function due to [.]+ operator.
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3. Infinite number of possible errors of finding the actual locations of the eavesdroppers.
Thus, a tractable approach to solving eq. 4.13 is proposed in the Section 4.3 - Section 4.6.

4.3

Tackling Non-smoothness of Objective Function
The non-smoothness of eq. 4.13a can be tackled as follows.

max
xu [n],yu [n],pu [n],pb [n]

N 
X

rug [n] − max

n=2

max

m∈M (4xm ,4ym )∈εm


rue [n] ,

(4.14a)

s.t. (4.13b) − (4.13g).

Proposition: Eq. 4.13 and eq. 4.14 are equivalent and share the same optimal solution. The
proof is given in Appendix A. However, a detailed explanation can be found in [50].
Eq. 4.14 is still non-convex and challenging to solve. To make it tractable, the optimization variables, i.e., the UAV-MR trajectory (xu , yu ), and the BS transmit power, pb ,
and the UAV-MR transmit power, pu , are solved sub-optimally. The division facilitates the
designing of the algorithm to solve eq. 4.13. Firstly, the BS transmit power, pb , and the
UAV-MR transmit power, pu , are optimized under a given UAV-MR trajectory location
(xu , yu ). Secondly, the UAV-MR trajectory location (xu , yu ) is optimized under the optimal
pu and pb . The iteration continues till the process converges.

4.4

Sub-optimal Solution of the UAV-MR and the BS Transmit Power
The UAV-MR and the BS transmit power optimization for a given trajectory is prac-

ticably feasible if the UAV-MR is required to serve in a fixed location, such as military,
border surveillance, and smart health networks, etc. For a given UAV-MR trajectory location (xu , yu ), the optimal solution of the UAV-MR transmit power, pu and the BS transmit
power, pb can be written from eq. 4.13 as
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max
pu [n],pb [n]

N 
X
rug [n] − max
n=2

max


rue [n] ,

m∈M (4xm ,4ym )∈εm

(4.15a)

s.t. (4.13b), (4.13d) − (4.13g).

The optimal solution of eq. 4.15 needs to satisfy all the constraints. However, eq. 4.15a
(i.e. the objective function) and eq. 4.13b are not a convex function yet. Thus, in order to
tackle eq. 4.15a, the following expression can be written as

rsnew [n]

=

N 
X
n=2





pu [n] new1
pu [n]
log2 1 + 2 cug [n] − log2 1 + 2 cue [n] .
σ
σ

(4.16)

1 can be defined as follows.
Moreover, using eqs. 2.1 - 2.2, cnew
ue

1
cnew
ue [n] =

min

β0
.
(xu [n] − xm − 4xm )2 + (yu [n] − ym − 4ym )2 + h2f

(4.17)

(4xm ,4ym )∈εm

However, eq. 4.17 is still not tractable due to the presence of (4xm , 4ym ) ∈ εm . Thus,
substituting eq. 2.4 in eq. 4.17, the following expression can be found.

cnew
ue [n] =

min
(4xm ,4ym )∈εm

≈

min
(4xm ,4ym )∈εm

β0
2 +b
(xu [n] − xm )2 + (yu [n] − ym )2 + h2f + lm
β0
,
2
(xu [n] − xm )2 + (yu [n] − ym )2 + h2f + lm

(4.18)

where b = −2(xu [n] − xm ) 4 xm − 2(yu [n] − ym ) 4 ym , which is negligible as (4xm , 4ym )
is significantly small. However, from eq. 4.18, it can be said that the distance between
the actual eavesdropper m, which is (xm , ym ) and the UAV-MR location, which is (xu , yu )
is greater than the eavesdropper circular region lm (the detail information can be found
in [33]). The distance between the UAV-MR and the actual location of the eavesdropper m
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can be expressed as

du,e [n] =

p
(xu [n] − xm )2 + (yu [n] − ym )2 .

(4.19)

If du,e [n] > lm , then cnew
ue is
β0
cnew
.
ue [n] = p
2 ) 2 + h2
( (xu [n] − xm )2 + (yu [n] − ym )2 − lm
f

(4.20)

If du,e [n] ≤ lm , then cnew
ue is
cnew
ue [n] =

β0
.
h2f

(4.21)

Moreover, eq. 4.13b is not a convex. It can be tackled to make it convex by introducing
variable, Γ as follows.
n
X

Γ[j] ≤

j=2

n−1
X



pb [j]cbu [j]
, n = 2, ...., N,
log2 1 +
σ2

(4.22)


pu [n]cug [n]
1+
, n = 1, 2, ...., N − 1.
σ2

(4.23)

j=1


Γ[n] ≤ log2

Eq. 4.22 - 4.23 are equivalent to eq. 4.13b, which are also convex. Eq. 4.15 can be
reformulated as follows.

max
pu [n],pb [n],Γ[n]

N 
X
n=2



pu [n]cnew
ue [n]
,
Γ[n] − log2 1 +
σ2

(4.24a)

s.t. (4.22) − (4.23), (4.13d) − (4.13g).

Comparing eq. 4.15 and eq. 4.24, it is obvious that the optimal solution of eq. 4.24
satisfies all the constraints in eq. 4.15. The theory of contradiction can prove it. Thus
it can be said that eq. 4.15 and eq. 4.24 are equivalent as eqs. 4.22 - 4.23 are equivalent
to eq. 4.13b. However, eq. 4.24 is not a convex function due to its objective function i.e.,
eq. 4.24a. Fortunately, eq. 4.24 is solvable at some pfu [n] feasible points using the difference
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of the concave (DC) method. The main idea of the DC method is that it linearizes the
objective function at some feasible points.
Thus, using first-order Taylor series expansion and f (g f ) + f 0 (g)(g − g f ) ≤ f (g),
eq. 4.24a can be expressed as

rsnew [n]

=

N 
X

Γ[n] −

f
cnew
ue [n](pu [n] − pu [n])

1 + pfu [n]cnew
ue [n]

n=2



pfu [n]cnew
ue [n]
− log2 1 +
.
σ2

(4.25)

Thus, the reformulated optimization problem can be written as

max
pu [n],pb [n],Γ[n]

N 
X

Γ[n] −

f
cnew
ue [n](pu [n] − pu [n])

1 + pfu [n]cnew
ue [n]

n=2



pfu [n]cnew
ue [n]
− log2 1 +
,
σ2

(4.26a)

s.t. (4.22) − (4.23), (4.13d) − (4.13g).

Lemma 1 The semi-closed and sub-optimal solution of pb and pu are as follows.

p∗u [n]



PN
 1 − i=n λi pfu [n]cnew
ue [n]
=

f
η + cnew
ue [n](ηpu [n] + 1)

p∗b [n]

 X

N
= [
λj −
j=n+1

1
−
cug [n]

1
cbu [n]

+
, ∀n,

(4.27)

+
, ∀n.

(4.28)

where λj is the dual Lagrangian variables. Both eqs. 4.27 - 4.28 are the optimal solution of
eq. 4.26.
Moreover, [ and η are the non-negative parameters. [ and η parameters meet the
following conditions, respectively.

pab =

N −1
1 X ∗
pb [n],
N −1

(4.29)

n=1
N

pau =

1 X ∗
pu [n].
N −1
n=2

(4.30)

30
In order to get the Lagrange dual optimal solution, the dual Lagrange variable, λ must
P
satisfy N
n=2 λ ≤ 1.
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix B. More detail information can be found in [41].

4.5

Sub-optimal Solution of the UAV-MR Trajectory Design
Now, the optimal UAV-MR trajectory location (xu , yu ) is achieved for the optimal

UAV-MR transmit power, pb and the BS transmit power, pu , which are achieved from
Section 4.4. This scenario may also be correspondent to the practical situation; for example,
the UAV-MR and the BS transmit the fixed power due to their hardware limitations. The
sub-optimal problem can be expressed as follows.

max
xu [n],yu [n]

N
X

[an − bn ],

(4.31a)

n=2

s.t. (4.13b) − (4.13c).

where


β0
pu [n]
,
an = log2 1 + 2
σ xu [n]2 + yu [n]2 + h2f

bn = log2

pu [n]
1+ 2
σ

min
(4xm ,4ym )∈εm


β0
.
a )2 + h2
(xu [n] − xam )2 + (yu [n] − ym
f

(4.32)

(4.33)

Eq. 4.31 is still not a convex problem due to the objective function (i.e., eq. 4.31a)
and the information causality constraint in eq. 4.13b. Moreover, this sub-optimal problem
cannot be solved sub-optimally in the polynomial time due to the infinite number of possible
multiple locations errors of the eavesdroppers, i.e., (4xm , 4ym ). In order to tackle the nonconvexity of eq. 4.31a and eq. 4.13b, slack variables z, t, u, and variable Γ are introduced
to solve the problem sub-optimally.
Firstly, in order to tackle the non-convexity of eq. 4.13b, it can be reformulated as
follows.
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n
X
j=2

Γ[j] ≤

n−1
X


log2

j=1


β0 pb [j]
, n = 2, ...., N,
1+ 2
σ [(xu [j] − xb )2 + (yu [j] − yb )2 + h2f ]


Γ[n] ≤ log2 1 +


β0 pu [n]
, n = 1, 2, ...., N − 1,
σ 2 (x2u [n] + yu2 [n] + h2f )

(4.34)

(4.35)

where Γ is newly introduced variable. However, eqs. 4.34 - 4.35 are not convex. In order
to tackle the non-convexity, slack variables, t and u are introduced in eqs. 4.34 - 4.35,
respectively, as follows.
n
X
j=2

Γ[j] ≤

n−1
X
j=1


log2


β0 pb [j]
1+ 2
, n = 2, ...., N,
σ t[j]

(xu [j] − xb )2 + (yu [j] − yb )2 + h2f − t[j] ≤ 0.

(4.36)

(4.37)

Eqs. 4.36 - 4.37 are reformulated by introducing the slack variable t from eq. 4.34.


β0 pu [n]
Γ[n] ≤ log2 1 + 2
, n = 1, 2, ...., N − 1,
σ u[n]

(4.38)

xu [n]2 + yu [n]2 + h2f − u[n] ≤ 0.

(4.39)

On the other hand, eqs. 4.38 - 4.39 are reformulated by introducing the slack variable
u from eq. 4.35.
However, slack variables, t and u, can be expressed as follows
∆

t = [t[1], t[2], t[3], ...t[N ]]† ,
∆

u = [u[1], u[2], u[3], ...u[N ]]† .

(4.40)

(4.41)

Moreover, first-order Taylor expansion can be applied to the logarithm functions of both
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eq. 4.36 and eq. 4.38. From eq. 4.36, it can be written using first-order Taylor expansion as
follows.

∂ log2 1 +

β0 pb [j]
σ 2 t[j]


=−

∂t[j]

(t2 [j] +

β0 pb [j]
σ2
.
β0 pb [j]
t[j])
ln
2
2
σ

(4.42)

At feasible point tf [j], the following expression can be written, using f (g f ) + f 0 (g)(g −
g f ) ≤ f (g), where (.)f and (.)0 are the feasible and partial derivative, respectively, as follows.
β0 pb [j] f
(t [j] − t[j])
σ2
tf [j](tf [j] + β0σpb2[j] ) ln 2





β0 pb [j]
β0 pb [j]
+ 1+ 2 f
≤ log2 1 + 2
.
σ t[j]
σ t [j]

(4.43)

Using eqs. 4.42 - 4.43, eq. 4.34 can be reformulated as follows.
n
X

Γ[j] ≤

j=2

n−1
X
j=1

β0 pb [j] f
(t [j] − t[j])
σ2
tf [j](tf [j] + β0σpb2[j] ) ln 2



β0 pb [j]
+ log2 1 + 2 f
.
σ t [j]

(4.44)

Similarity, eq. 4.38 can be rewritten as

∂ log2 1 +
∂u[n]
where pnu =

β0 pu [n]
.
σ2

pn
u
u[n]


=−

pnu
,
(u2 [n] + pnu u[n]) ln 2

(4.45)

At feasible point uf [n], the following expression can be written, using

f (g f ) + f 0 (g)(g − g f ) ≤ f (g), where (.)f and (.)0 are the feasible and partial derivative,
respectively, as follows.




pnu
pnu
pnu (uf [n] − u[n])
+ log2 1 + f
≤ log2 1 +
,
u[n]
uf [n](uf [n] + pnu ) ln 2
u [n]

(4.46)

Using eqs. 4.45 - 4.46, eq. 4.35 can be reformulated as follows


pnu (uf [n] − u[n])
pnu
Γ[n] ≤ f
+ log2 1 + f
.
u [n](uf [n] + pnu ) ln 2
u [n]


(4.47)
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Due to introducing the slack variables, eq. 4.31 can be reformulated to eq. 4.48 as
follows

max
xu [n],yu [n],z[n],t[n],u[n],Γ[n]

s.t.

min
(4xm ,4ym )∈εm



N 
X
pnu
,
Γ[n] − log2 1 +
z[n]

(4.48a)

n=2

(xu [n] − xm − 4xm )2 + (yu [n] − ym − 4ym )2 + h2f ≥ z[n],

z[n] ≥ h2f ,

(4.48b)
(4.48c)

(4.13c), (4.37), (4.39), (4.44), (4.47),

where z is also a slack variable, followed by

∆

z = [z[1], z[2], z[3], ..., z[N ]† ,

(4.49)

Eq. 4.31 and eq. 4.48 share the same sub-optimal solution of the UAV-MR trajectory
location, i.e. sub-optimal solution of the UAV-MV trajectory location (xu , yu ). This thesis
focuses on solving eq. 4.48 in order to achieve sub-optimal solution of (xu , yu ).
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix C.
However, eqs. 4.48 is still challenging to solve due to the infinite number of unknown
possible errors from the actual location of eavesdropper m in eq. 4.48b.
To make eqs. 4.48b tractable, eq. 2.1 - 2.4 are substituted in eq. 4.48b as

a
−(xu [n] − xam − 4xm )2 − (yu [n] − ym
− 4ym )2 + z[n] − h2f ≤ 0, ∀m,

2
2
4 x2m + 4ym
≤ lm
, ∀m.

(4.50)

(4.51)

S-P rocedure method is applied to tackle the infinite number of possible locations errors
of the eavesdroppers. An overview of S-P rocedure is described in Appendix D.
f
f
Any feasible point (4xfm , 4ym
) exists, for example (4xfm , 4ym
) = (1, 1), such that

2

2

f
2
4 xfm + 4ym
≤ lm
.

(4.52)
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Then the following implication holds

2
2
− (xu [n] − xm − 4xm )2 − (yu [n] − ym − 4ym )2 + z[n] − h2f ≤ 0 ⇒ 4x2m + 4ym
≤ lm
(4.53)

if and only if εm ≥ 0 exists such that



a
[n]
a
[n]
a
[n]
2
3
 1



 b [n] b [n] b [n]   0,
2
3
 1



c1 [n] c2 [n] c3 [n]

(4.54)

a1 [n] = εm [n] + 1,

(4.55)

a2 [n] = 0,

(4.56)

a3 [n] = xm − xu [n],

(4.57)

b1 [n] = 0,

(4.58)

b2 [n] = εm [n] + 1,

(4.59)

b3 [n] = ym − yu [n],

(4.60)

c1 [n] = xm − xu [n],

(4.61)

c2 [n] = ym − yu [n],

(4.62)

2
c3 [n] = (xu [n] − xm )2 + (yu [n] − ym )2 + h2f − z[n] − lm
εm [n].

(4.63)

where
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Thus, eq. 4.54 is equivalent eq. 4.48b. Now, eq. 4.48 can be reformulated as follows
N 
X

max
xu [n],yu [n],z[n],u[n],t[n],Γ[n]ϕ[n]

n=2



pnu
,
Γ[n] − log2 1 +
z[n]

(4.64a)

s.t. z[n] ≥ h2f ,

(4.64b)

εm [n] ≥ 0,

(4.64c)

(4.13c), (4.37), (4.39), (4.44), (4.47), (4.54),

where ϕ is also a slack variables, which can be expressed as follows.
∆

ϕ = [ε1 , ε2 , ε3 , ......, εm ],

(4.65)

∆

where εm = [εm [1], εm [2], εm [3], ......, εm [N ]]† . Moreover, eq. 4.64 is not still a convex problem due to eq. 4.64a. Eq. 4.54 is a a function of (xu [n], yu [n], z[n], εm [n]), which is not linear
in nature because of the presence of [.]2 . Thus, these make eq. 4.64 too challenging to solve
it optimally.
In order to solve eq. 4.64, an efficient algorithm is proposed in this work, which can solve
the non-convex problem iteratively. Moreover, this algorithm can achieve the approximate
solution of eq. 4.64. The explanation of the algorithm is described as follows.
• Let the following the feasible points of the UAV-MR trajectory location, (xu , yu ), and
the slack variable, z,
∆

xu = [xfu [1], xfu [2], xfu [3], ......, xfu [N ]],

(4.66)

∆

yu = [yuf [1], yuf [2], xfu [3], ......, yuf [N ]],

(4.67)

∆

z = [z f [1], z f [2], z f [3], ......, z f [N ]].

• The first order Taylor expansion has been implemented in log2 1 +

(4.68)
pn
u
z[n]


, where

pnu = γpu [n], can be expressed using the first order Taylor expansion at feasible point
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z f [n] as follows.

∂ log2 1 +

pn
u
z[n]


=−

∂z[n]

pnu
.
(z 2 [n] + pnu z[n]) ln 2

(4.69)

At feasible point z f [n], the following expression can be written, using f (g f )+f 0 (g)(g −
g f ) ≤ f (g), where (.)f and (.)0 are the feasible and partial derivative, respectively, as
follows.




pnu
pnu
pnu (z f [n] − z[n])
+log2 1 + f
≤ log2 1 +
.
z[n]
z f [n](z f [n] + pnu ) ln 2
z [n]

(4.70)

• Moreover, the first order Taylor expansion of x2u [n] and yu2 [n] is also implemented at
feasible points xfu [n] and yuf [n], respectively, as follows.

∂x2u [n]
= 2xu [n],
∂xu [n]

(4.71)

∂yu2 [n]
= 2yu [n].
∂yu [n]

(4.72)

Using f (g f ) + f 0 (g)(g − g f ) ≤ f (g), it can be written as follows.
2

− xfu [n] + 2xfu [n]xu [n] ≤ x2u [n],
2

− yuf [n] + 2yuf [n]yu [n] ≤ yu2 [n].

(4.73)

(4.74)

• Moreover, c3 [n] needs to be expressed at some feasible points due to the non-linear
parameter, i.e., [.]2 . Using eq. 4.73 -4.74, the following can be found.
2

2

cf3 [n] = h2f − z[n] − xfu [n] − yuf [n] + 2xfu [n]xu [n] + x2m
+

2
ym

+

2yuf [n]yu [n]

− 2xm xu [n] − 2ym yu [n] −

2
lm
εm [n].

(4.75)
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Thus, using the approximation in eqs. 4.66 - 4.75, eq. 4.64 is approximated to eq. 4.76
as follows
N 
X

max
xu [n],yu [n],z[n],t[n],u[n],Γ[n],ϕ[n]




Γ[n] − q[n] ,

(4.76a)

n=2



 a1 [n] a2 [n] a3 [n]

s.t. 
 b1 [n] b2 [n] b3 [n]

c1 [n] c2 [n] cf3 [n]



  0,



(4.76b)

z[n] ≥ h2f ,

(4.76c)

εm [n] ≥ 0,

(4.76d)

(4.13c), (4.37), (4.39), (4.44), (4.47),

where
q[n] =



pnu (z f [n] − z[n])
pnu
−
log
.
1
+
2
z f [n](z f [n] + pnu ) ln 2
z f [n]

(4.77)

q[n] is derived from eq. 4.70. Eq. 4.76 is a semidefinite programming problem. The solution
of the newly formulated problem eq. 4.76 has a feasible solution to eq. 4.64. This can be
shown as follows.
• Using the eqs. 4.73 - 4.74, which are lower bounds for x2u [n] and yu2 [n], respectively,
the following condition is true.


 

 a1 [n] a2 [n] a3 [n]   a1 [n] a2 [n] a3 [n]

 
 b [n] b [n] b [n]   b [n] b [n] b [n]
2
3
2
3
  1
 1
 

f
c1 [n] c2 [n] c3 [n]
c1 [n] c2 [n] c3 [n]




.



(4.78)

Thus, eq. 4.76b implies to eq, 4.54. Thus, the solution of eq. 4.76 is a feasible solution
to eq. 4.64.


pn
u
• From eq. 4.70, it is clear that eq. 4.70 is a lower bound of log2 1 + z[n] . Thus, lower
bound of eq. 4.64a is maximized using eq. 4.76a, which is equal to the lower bound
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at (xfu , yuf , zf ) feasible point. Thus, eq. 4.76a shares the same or smaller solution
(xfu , yuf , zf ) than eq. 4.64a.
Now, eq. 4.76 can be solved using IPM. An overview of the IPM is described in Appendix E.

4.6

Proposed Efficient Algorithm
Now, an efficient algorithm is proposed to solve the original problem in eq. 4.13 op-

timally. The detail of the overall achievable secrecy rate problem is summarized in the
algorithm 1. The algorithm 1 solves eq. 4.13 sub-optimally, using eq. 4.26 and eq. 4.76.
Eventually, the algorithm can achieve the optimal solution until it converges. However, the
solution of the UAV-MR trajectory location and the UAV-MR and the BS transmit power
is given as follows.
• The UAV-MR and the BS transmit power is optimized under given UAV-MR trajectory location, using eq. 4.26.
• The UAV-MR trajectory is optimized under the optimal the UAV-MR, and the BS
transmit power, using eq. 4.76.
• The overall algorithm is solved iteratively until it converges.
The overall algorithm solves the original problem both alternatively and iteratively. It
continues until algorithm 1 converges. The algorithm 1 is summarized as follows.

4.7

Summary of the Chapter
This chapter solves the achievable secrecy rate maximization problem in several steps

as the conventional optimization techniques cannot solve the problem. Firstly, the discrete
time is applied to the optimization problem so that the UAV-MR trajectory location, and
the transmit power of the UAV-MR and the BS constraints can be analyzed in each static
and the equal time slot. After that, the non-smoothness of the objective function is tackled.
Then, two sub-problems of the original optimization problem are formulated. They are
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Algorithm 1 Proposed algorithm for optimal solution in eq. 4.13
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:

Initialize : xfu [n] = xu f(j−1) [n], yuf [n] = yu f(j−1) [n], pu [n] = pu (j−1) [n], pb [n] = pb (j−1)[n] ,
and j = 0.
Set j ←− j + 1
Optimization:
repeat
Solve sub-optimal UAV-MR and BS transmit power design (i.e., eq. 4.26) under
given UAV-MR trajectory location xu and yu .
Obtain optimal solution pu and pb .
Solve sub-optimal UAV-MR trajectory design (i.e., eq. 4.76) under the optimal UAVMR transmit power, pu and BS transmit power, pb .
Obtain optimal solution xu and yu .
Then go to Step: 5.
until convergence

named as the UAV-MR, and the BS transmit power optimization location under the given
UAV-MR trajectory. After that, the UAV-MR trajectory location is optimized under given
the UAV-MR, and the BS transmit power. Finally, an efficient algorithm is proposed based
on DC, S-P rocedure, and IPM methods.
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CHAPTER 5
SIMULATION RESULTS
This chapter presents the simulation results, which validate the improved achievable
secrecy rate performance based on the proposed robust joint UAV-MR trajectory, and
transmit power of the UAV-MR and the BS, i.e., the algorithm 1. The proposed robust
model in the algorithm 1 is compared with the backbench method, named as the non-robust
UAV-MR trajectory, and transmit power of the UAV-MR, and the BS optimization. The
non-robust approach is defined as follows. Like the known locations of the BS and the
ground user to the UAV-MR, the UAV-MR also considers the approximate location as the
exact locations of the eavesdroppers on the ground. The non-robust scheme in terms of the
locations of the eavesdroppers is defined as follows.

xam = xm + 4xm ,

(5.1)

a
ym
= ym + 4ym ,

(5.2)

a = y . However, the UAV-MR flies,
where (4xm , 4ym ) = (0, 0). Thus, xam = xm and ym
m

following the unidirectional trajectory path from the BS to the ground user, at a fixed
velocity during the UAV-MR flight time. The acceleration process and the deceleration
process of the UAV-MR are considered insignificant in the proposed system. The list of
parameters used in the simulation is illustrated in Table 5.1.

5.1

The UAV-MR Trajectory Design
Fig. 5.1 shows the UAV-MR trajectory locations for the proposed algorithm 1. It can

be seen from Fig. 5.1, the UAV-MR starts hovering between the BS and the ground user.
Moreover, the UAV-MR starts hovering from the BS to the ground user, followed by a
trajectory path. For the UAV-MR trajectory path, it can be seen that the UAV-MR keeps
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Table 5.1: List of parameters used in the simulation
Symbol
Description
The radius of circular region of the eavesdropper 8 m
Approximate location of the eavesdropper

(−400, 0) m

The BS location

(100, 500) m

The UAV-MR fixed altitude

80 m

Dicretized equal time slot

1

The UAV-MR flying speed

50 m/s

At d0 = 1 m distance, γ(=

β0
)
σ2

80 dB

BS
500

400

yu

300

200

100

0
ground user
-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

xu
Fig. 5.1: The UAV-MR robust trajectory design.
a safe distance from the location of the eavesdropper. The location of the eavesdropper is
considered (−400, 0) to design the trajectory path. Eventually, when the UAV-MR flight
time increases, the proposed algorithm 1 is proved efficient. For the proposed algorithm,
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the UAV-MR flies towards the ground user while keeping a safe distance from the eavesdropper. Eventually, the UAV-MR reaches the peak point near to the ground user. Thus,
the proposed algorithm 1 efficiently adjusts the UAV-MR hovering from the eavesdropper.

5.2

The Achievable Secrecy Rate vs the UAV-MR Flight Time
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Fig. 5.2: The achievable secrecy rate at UAV-MR velocity.

The achievable secrecy rate is achieved for the UAV-MR velocity versus the UAVMR flight time in Fig. 5.2 for both robust and non-robust scheme. For robust scheme,
it is observed that the UAV-MR achieves the improved secrecy rate when the UAV-MR
velocity is vm = 50 m/s. On the other hand, the non-robust scheme does not guarantee
improved performance compared to the robust scheme, when the UAV-MR speed is the
same. Finally, the achievable secrecy rate is improved for the higher UAV-MR flight time,
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T , for the proposed algorithm 1. On the other hand, the non-robust achievable secrecy rate
becomes stable after a specific UAV-MR flight time. Thus, the achievable secrecy rate is
significantly improved for the proposed algorithm 1, compared to the non-robust approach.

5.3

The Achievable Secrecy Rate for Different Eavesdropper Circular Regions
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Fig. 5.3: The achievable secrecy rate for the circular regions of the eavesdroppers.

Fig. 5.3 shows the achievable secrecy rate for the proposed algorithm 1, when the circular region of the eavesdropper’s location is 15 m. Then, this is compared with the non-robust
scheme, meaning the UAV-MR considers the approximated location of the eavesdropper as
the exact location, i.e., lm = 0 As shown in Fig. 5.3, the higher secrecy rate for the proposed algorithm 1 is achieved for the circular region of the eavesdropper, which makes the
proposed algorithm 1 efficient. On the other hand, the achievable secrecy rate significantly
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decreases when there is no circular region for the eavesdroppers to tract its location.

5.4

The Achievable Secrecy Rate vs the UAV-MR Average Power
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Fig. 5.4: The achievable secrecy rate at various UAV-MR altitude vs the UAV-MR average
power.

Fig. 5.4 describes the achievable secrecy rate both for the proposed algorithm 1 and
the non-robust scheme versus the UAV-MR average power. The achievable secrecy rate
increases with the increase of the UAV-MR average power, as shown in Fig. 5.4. However,
comparing with the non-robust algorithm, the proposed algorithm 1 proves the improved
achievable secrecy rate performance. However, both robust and non-robust algorithm, the
achievable secrecy rate increases with the increment of the UAV-MR average power. The
achievable secrecy rate varies because the achievable secrecy rate maximization problem
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(eq. 4.13) is dependent on the UAV-MR trajectory location in the high transmit power
zone. From Fig. 5.4, it is also seen that the UAV-MR has the better achievable secrecy rate
for the UAV-MR altitude, 80 m, for the proposed algorithm 1. Thus, when the UAV-MR
altitude is 80 m, the proposed algorithm 1 has the best performance.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
This chapter summarizes the contribution of this investigation so that the readers can
get the idea of the contribution and challenges of the proposed UAV-MR physical layer
security via joint robust resource allocation. The main idea of the proposed system model
is described as follows:
The UAV-MR based next-generation wireless networks is considered via robust joint
UAV-MR trajectory location, and transmit power of the UAV-MR and the BS optimization.
Moreover, the system considers the active presence of multiple eavesdroppers in the network.
Though the UAV-MR knows the actual location of the BS and the ground user, the actual
locations of eavesdroppers are unknown to the UAV-MR. The UAV-MR only knows the
circular region, where the eavesdroppers are located. The information causality constraint
is also considered in the system, which allows the UAV-MR to forward only received secure
information from the BS to the ground user. Finally, the proposed model aims to maximize
the achievable secrecy rate.
The thesis discusses the prospect and challenges of the UAV-MR based next-generation
wireless networks as follows. The literature review, along with the UAV-MR description, has
been studied in the Chapter 1. Chapter 1 covers the related, and recent research conducted
in the field of physical layer security.
Chapter 2 focuses on the overview of the proposed UAV-MR robust resource allocation
to secure the physical layer of next-generation wireless networks. Chapter 2 has a detailed
explanation of the various parameters, such as LOS communication links, etc. Moreover,
the advantages of UAV-MR over the UAV-SR is discussed. Moreover, how the unknown
presence of multiple eavesdroppers affects the overall system performance, is discussed. The
3D location of the UAV-MR, the BS, and the ground user are also illustrated in the chapter.
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The summary of Chapter 3 is described as follows. The problem formulation is discussed in detail. This chapter formulates the BS to UAV-MR achievable data rate, considering the channel power gain based on reference distance do = 1 m. Though the UAV-MR
is changing its location with time, the BS has a fixed location on the ground. However, the
channel gain between the UAV-MR and the BS is calculated prior data rate formulation.
Moreover, the average and maximum BS transmit power constraints are considered while
formulating the BS to UAV-MR data rate. After that, the UAV-MR to ground user achievable channel gain is calculated before the UAV-MR to ground user data rate calculation.
The data rate is calculated based on LOS communication link. Moreover, the average and
maximum UAV-MR transmit power constraint to also considered, which is also essential to
tackle the achievable secrecy rate optimization problem.
However, the active presence of eavesdroppers may degrade overall system performance.
Thus, this chapter also considers the UAV-MR-eavesdroppers achievable data rate. While
calculating the UAV-MR-eavesdroppers achievable data rate, the data rate is maximized
based on the unknown locations of eavesdroppers.
The main idea of Chapter 4 is described as follows. This chapter mainly focuses on the
formulating the achievable secrecy rate maximization problem. However, the optimization
problem is not tractable due to its non-convexity, and the infinite number of possible errors
of finding the actual locations of eavesdroppers. This chapter also proposes a step by
step process to solve the complex achievable secrecy rate maximization problem. Firstly,
the discrete linear state space is applied to the optimization problem. However, it is still
challenging to tackle the optimization problem due to the non-smoothness of the objective
function. Thus, the non-smoothness of the objective function is tackled. Moreover, Chapter
4 solves the optimization problem sub-optimally, such as the sub-optimal solution of the
UAV-MR and the BS transmit power under the given UAV-MR trajectory location, and
the sub-optimal solution of the UAV-MR trajectory location under the optimal UAV-MR
and the BS transmit power.
Firstly, the sub-optimal UAV-MR and the BS transmit power is achieved under given
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the optimal UAV-MR trajectory location, using the dual Lagrangian variables and standard
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions (KKT) conditions.
Secondly, the sub-optimal UAV-MR trajectory location is solved as follows. Slack
variables are introduced to tackle non-convexity of the objective function and the infinite
number of possible error in eavesdroppers actual locations. Moreover, this infinite number
of possible error in eavesdroppers actual locations are transformed into a new formulation
based on S-P rocedure. Finally, based on Taylor expression, the optimization problem is
solved, and the sub-optimal solution of the UAV-MR trajectory location is achieved.
At the end of Chapter 4, an efficient algorithm is proposed, which solves the achievable
secrecy rate maximization problem iteratively and alternatively.
Chapter 5 provides the simulation results, and compares the proposed achievable secrecy rate maximization problem, with some backbench methods, such as joint robust resource allocation.
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APPENDIX A
Non-smoothness of Objective Function
The optimal solution of both eq. 4.13a and eq. 4.14a is proved to be equal, meaning
eq. 4.13a and eq. 4.14a share the same optimal solution.
The Xa∗ is defined as the optimal value of eq. 4.13a, and the Xb∗ is the optimal value of
eq. 4.14a.
As [.] ≤ [.]+ , ∀., then it can be written as
Xb∗ ≤ Xa∗ .

(A.1)

However, (x∗u , yu∗ , p∗b , p∗u ) define the optimal solutions to eq. 4.13a. The expression of
p∗b , p∗u can be written as follows
p∗b = {p∗ [1], p∗ [2], ..., p∗ [N−1]},

(A.2)

p∗u = {p∗ [2], p∗ [3], ..., p∗ [N ]}.

(A.3)

Now let f (pu [n]) = rs . The feasible solution of eq. 4.14a can be expressed as follows
p∗b = {p∗ [1], p∗ [2], ..., p∗ [N−1]},

(A.4)

p∗u = {p∗ [2], p∗ [3], ..., p∗ [N ]}.

(A.5)

Let the objective values of eq. 4.14a attain at (xu∗ , yu ∗ , pb ∗ , pu ∗ ) as X∗ . The newly
constructed solution (xu∗ , yu ∗ , pb ∗ , pu ∗ ) ensures that X∗ =Xa∗ .
Since (xu∗ , yu ∗ , pb ∗ , pu ∗ ) is feasible to eq. 4.14a, it follows that X∗ ≤ Xb∗ and Xb∗ ≥ Xa∗ .
Finally, Xa∗ = Xb∗ .
Thus, the proof is complete.
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APPENDIX B
Sub-optimal Solution of the UAV-MR and the BS Transmit Power
It is clear that pb [n] and pb [n] have the optimal solution, which can be illustrated as
the form of liquid filling. However, pb [n] and pb [n] have different characteristics, which are
equivalent to different liquid levels. Technically, the power allocation of the base station,
pb and UAV-MR, pu can be considered as staircase liquid filling over the slots. The power
allocation of the BS and the UAV-MR is possible due to the non-negative and non-increasing
parameter, [.
However, due to the presence of eavesdroppers, the UAV-MR liquid level does not
always monotone over the UAV-MR flight period. Now, the dual optimal variable λn that
minimizes the Lagrange dual function needs to be found. The ellipsoid method [61] can be
applied to tackle the Lagrange duality. The following constraints can minimize the function.
N
X

λn ≤ 1, n = 2, 3, 4, ....., N,

(B.1)

n=2

λn ≥ 0, n = 2, 3, 4, ....., N,

(B.2)

where λn is the Lagrange dual variable. Using the above process and methods, the achievable secrecy maximization problem can be tackled. However, pu [n] needs to be updated
iteratively while solving the achievable secrecy rate maximization problem. This is summarized in algorithm 1.
The optimal solution of the UAV-MR transmit power, and the BS transmit power can
be proved in the following way as well.
In the optimization problem 4.24, the information-causality constraint in eq. 4.23 is
coupled with the UAV-MR, and the BS transmit power. Thus, it is essential to decouple
them, which can be done by using the partial Lagrangian method. The partial Lagrangian
is the function of L(pu , pb , Γ, λn ). L(pu , pb , Γ, λn ) can be expressed as follows
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(B.3)
Thus, the Lagrange dual function of eq. 4.24 can be expressed as follows

max
pu [n],pb [n],Γ[n],λn [n]

L(pu , pb , Γ, λn ),

(B.4a)

s.t. (4.23), (4.13d) − (4.13g),

where λn ≤ 0, ∀n. In order to achieve the optimal value, this project focuses only on eq. B.4
can be maximized using eq. B.3 to achieve the dual function with fixed λn . Then the dual
solution of λ∗n can be found by minimizing the dual function. Finally, the optimal value
of the UAV-MR transmit power, and the BS transmit power can be achieved based on λ∗n .
Thus, the minimization of Lagrange dual function over UAV-MR transmit power and BS
transmit power, where λn is fixed, can be derived from eq. B.3.
If the function over pb is fp b (λn ) and the function over pu is fp u (λn ), then the following
expression can be written

f (λn ) = fp u (λn ) + fp b (λn ),
where

(B.5)
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fp u (λn ) =

max
pu [n],Γ[n]
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(B.6a)
s.t. (4.13f ) − (4.13g).

and

fp b (λn ) = max
pb [n]

N
−1  X
N
X
n=1

n=1


λj



pb [n]cbu [n]
,
log2 1 +
σ2

(B.7a)

s.t. (4.13d) − (4.13e).

Thus, in order to obtain the sub-optimal solution of the UAV-MR transmit power,
pu and the BS transmit power, pb , eq. B.6 and eq. B.7, respectively, need to be solved.
However, it is assumed that Lagrange dual variable, λn is given while solving those eq. B.6
and eq. B.7. Thus, by applying the standard KKT conditions, the optimal solution of the
UAV-MR transmit power, pu , and the BS transmit power pb can be achieved.
Thus, the proof is complete.
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APPENDIX C
Sub-optimal Solution of the Shared UAV-MR Trajectory Design
In both problems, followings are active.

x2u [n] + yu2 [n] + h2f − u[n] ≤ 0,

(C.1)

a 2
(xu [n] − xam )2 + (yu [n] − ym
) + h2f ≥ z[n].

(C.2)

min
(4xm ,4ym )∈εm

The contradiction theory can prove the sub-optimal solution of eq. 4.14 and eq. 4.31 is
equivalent, meaning they share the same sub-optimal solution.
Let both eq. C.1 and eq. C.2 are not active. Due to their inactivity, the objective



PN
pn
u
function of eq. 4.31, which is n=2 Γ[n] − log2 1 + z[n] , can be improved with the
increment of z[n].
Thus, the proof is complete.
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APPENDIX D
S-P rocedure
S-P rocedure defines a mathematical result, which tackles the non-negative quadratic
form under quadratic inequalities [53] - [55]. Let A and B; a and b; w1 and w2 ; and δ are
the symmetric matrices, vectors, and real numbers, non-negative number, respectively. The
inequality holds if and only if there exists n0 such that the following inequality holds
nT0 An0 + 2aT n0 + w1 ≤ 0,

(D.1)

Fianlly, the implication can be expressed as

nT1 An1 + 2aT n0 + w1 ≤ 0,

(D.2)

nT2 An2 + 2aT n0 + w2 ≤ 0,

(D.3)

Eqs. D.2 - D.3 holds the following such that it is positive semidefinite

 A
ε
aT
where ε is a non-negative number.





a   B
−
w1
bT


b 
.
w2
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APPENDIX E
Interior Point Method (IPM)
An interior point method (IPM) is a non-linear programming [56–59], which can solve
the non-linear optimization problem. Mathematically, it can be expressed as follows.

min g(x),

(E.1a)

s.t. dj ≥ 0.

(E.1b)

where eq. E.1a is a non-linear objective function, having the constraint in eq. E.1b. Moreover, j is defined as j = 1, 2, 3, ....., n. A barrier function can be introduced as

g(x) = bf (x, y) + y

n
X

log(dj (x)).

(E.2)

j=1

Eq. E.2 converges to the solution of eq. E.1a. y is defined as barrier parameter, which
also converges to 0. The barrier function gradient can be expressed as
∗

f −f =y

n
X
4dj (x)
j=1

dj (x)

.

(E.3)

Using the eq, E.3, it can proved that f is the gradient of g(x). Now, a dual variable is
introduced as follows.
λ ∈ Rm ,

(E.4)

y
.
dj

(E.5)

λj =

Eq. E.4 can be refereed as complementary slackness in KKT conditions. Using the
eq. E.3 - E.5, the follwing matrix can be achieved

WT =

f
.
λ

(E.6)
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where W is a matrix. The following expression can be achieved using the Newton method
[60], which can update (u, v) for (x, λ) as follows




Au

−W T u

BW u

Dv





  −f
=
y

−W T λ
−Dy



.

(E.7)

D and B are the diagonal matrices of λ and dj , respectively. Moreover, in eq. E.7, λ
must be greater or equal than zero, which can be proved using the eq. E.5.

